Linkable ring signatures have found many attractive applications. One of the recent important extensions is a linkable threshold ring signature (LTRS) scheme. Unfortunately, the existing LTRS schemes are only secure in the random oracle model (ROM). In this paper, we make the following contributions. First, we construct the first LTRS scheme that is secure without requiring the ROM. Further, we enhance the security of a threshold ring signature (for both linkable or non-linkable) by providing a stronger definition of anonymity. This strengthened notion makes threshold ring signature schemes more suitable in real life. Finally, we provide efficient schemes that outperform the existing schemes in the literature. Our scheme is particularly suitable for electronic commerce or electronic government where anonymity and accountability are the most concerned factors. © 2012 The Author. 
INTRODUCTION
Ring Signature. A ring signature scheme (such as [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] ) allows members of a group to sign messages on behalf of the group without any necessity to reveal their identities, i.e., providing signer anonymity. Additionally, it is impossible to decide whether two signatures have been issued by the same group member. In contrast to the notion of a group signature scheme (such as [8, 9, 10] ), the group formation in a ring signature is spontaneous and there exists no group manager who is responsible for revoking the signer's identity. That is, under the assumption that each user is already associated with a public key of any standard signature scheme, a user can form a group by simply collecting the public keys of all the group members including his own. These diversion group members can be totally unaware of being conscripted into the group.
Applications of ring signature schemes include whistle blowing [1] , anonymous membership authentication for ad hoc groups [11] , non-interactive deniable ring authentication [12] , smart grid systems [13] , perfect concurrent signature [14] and multi-designated verifiers signature [15] .
A "regular" ring signature is unlinkable. That is, no one can determine whether two ring signatures are generated by the same signer.
Linkable Ring Signature. Linkable ring signatures was first proposed by Liu et al. [16] in 2004. In this notion, the identity of the signer in a ring signature remains anonymous, but two ring signatures can be linked if they are signed by the same signer. Linkable ring signatures are suitable in many different practical applications, such as ad-hoc network authentication [16] , e-voting [17] and e-cash [18] . Regular ring signatures cannot be used for e-voting since any double votes remain undetectable as they are unlinkable. No one is able to find out whether any two signatures (with two votes) are generated by the same voter or not. Linkable ring signatures provide the remedy to this problem by allowing the public to detect any signer who has produced two or more signatures (i.e., votes).
We note that linkability is compulsorily embedded into the signature instead of voluntarily added in linkable ring signatures. If the signer refuses to add the correct linking information, the whole signature becomes invalid. In other words, linkability is enforced by the verifier. The signer cannot decline to do so. This is different from voluntarily added linkability. In this case, whether allowing the signature to be linked or not can be decided by the signer. This issue is also explained in [16] .
Linkability can only happen within the same event (e.g., a voting event). Two signatures from two different events cannot be linked, even though they are generated by the same signer. Although the earlier schemes such as [16, 19, 20] do not mention about this property, they can be modified trivially to achieve this property.
All previous linkable ring signature schemes (e.g., [21, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26] ) except the recent work by Fujisaki [27] are only proven secure in the random oracle model.
We also remark that Wang and Zhao [28] made some cryptanalysis to a number of previous linkable ring signature schemes. They also claimed that "To design secure linkable ring signature scheme is still an open problem.". In Appendix Appendix A, we demonstrate that their cryptanalysis is indeed invalid and hence, their claim is also incorrect.
Linkable Threshold Ring Signature. A (d, n)-linkable threshold ring signature (LTRS) has the similar notion to the (1-out-of-n) linkable ring signature. A (d, n)-LTRS scheme requires at least d signers to work collaboratively to generate a signature.
Those d participating signers can select any set of n entities including themselves without getting any consent from those diversion group members. Linkability for threshold ring signatures is diversified into individuallinkability and coalition-linkability. For individuallinkability, two signatures are linked if they share at least one common signer even though the two identity sets are different. On the other hand, two signatures are coalition-linked if the signer sets are exactly the same.
There are only two LTRS schemes in the literature. The first one was given by Tsang et al. in [21] which allows a separate type of public key. Another LTRS scheme was presented in [26] in ID-based setting. All of them rely on random oracles for proving their security.
Applications.
In addition to the applications described above for the non-threshold linkable ring signature, the threshold variant can be useful in the following situation. Assume there is an election for a company chairman. All management committee members are eligible to vote. Before the voting, each candidate should have at least d nominations within the management committee members. The nomination process should be anonymous. One committee member can only nominate one candidate. Otherwise, the nomination becomes invalid. In this case, threshold linkable ring signature can be deployed as it fulfills all the requirement:
• It provides anonymous to each nominator.
• It can make sure each nominatee to have at least d nominators.
• If a committee member nominates more than one candidate, those two nominations can be linked and will become invalid.
In the reality, the Hong Kong Chief Executive election uses the same mode. There are a small group of 1200 election committee members that can vote for the Chief Executive.
Each candidate should get at least 150 committee members for the nomination before becoming a candidate. The process should be anonymous. Threshold linkable ring signature can be fully suitable in this kind of nomination.
Our Contribution. The contribution of our paper can be classified into the following area:
1. We propose the first d-out-of-n Linkable Threshold Ring Signature (LTRS) scheme provable secure without random oracles. All previous LTRS schemes can be only proven secure in the random oracle model. 2. We enhance the security of threshold ring signature (linkable or non-linkable) by giving a stronger definition of anonymity, called Anonymity under Full Key Exposure and Insider Attack. Under this stronger notion, the adversary is not only given secret keys of the target users, it is also allowed to interact with some honest users. All previous threshold ring signature definition only allows the adversary to have user secret keys. 3. We achieve better efficiency when compared to other schemes (even with those rely on random oracles):
(a) When compared with other LTRS schemes, they require O(n 2 ) for the linking complexity while we can achieve O(d log d).
(b) Our scheme can be seen as a normal linkable ring signature when we set the threshold value d to 1. When compared to the Fujisaki scheme [27] , which is the only linkable ring signature scheme that can be proven secure without random oracles, the linking complexity of our scheme is O(1) while the Fujisaki scheme requires O(n log n). (c) Our scheme can be easily modified to achieve a regular threshold ring signature (i.e., without linkability), by using a different event tag every time. When compared to other threshold ring signature schemes, our signature size is O(d √ n) while all other schemes require at least O(n). When d < √ n, our signature size is smaller than all previous schemes. If the threshold value d is a small integer such as 2 or 3 while the value n is very large, our signature size is very short when compared to others. 
PRELIMINARIES
Pairings. We make use of bilinear groups of composite order. Let N be a composite number with factorization N = pq. G is a multiplicative cyclic group of order N . G p is its cyclic order-p subgroup, and G q is its cyclic order-q subgroup. G T is a multiplicative group of order N . g is a generator of G. Thenê is a bilinear map such that e : G × G → G T with the following properties:
• Bilinearity: For all u, v ∈ G, and a, b ∈ Z,
• Computability: It is efficient to computeê(u, v) for all u, v ∈ G.
The group operations on G and G T can be performed efficiently. Bit strings corresponding to elements of G and of G T can be recognized efficiently.
Mathematical Assumptions. For our scheme, we assume three problems are difficult to solve in the setting described above.
, where g p ∈ R G p , and α ∈ R Z p , compute and output g 1 α+r p ∈ G p and r ∈ Z p . Definition 2.2 (Subgroup Decision in G q [30] ). Given w selected at random either from G (with probability 1/2) or from G q (with probability 1/2), decide whether w is in G q . For this problem one is given the description of G, but not given the factorization of N . Definition 2.3 (Q -Decisional Diffie-Hellman Inversion (DDHI) [27] ). Given the tuple (g, A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A Q ), where
These assumptions are formalized by measuring an adversary's success probability for SDH problem and an adversary's guessing advantage for the subgroup decision problem and the DDHI problem.
Boneh-Boyen Signature. Boneh and Boyen [29] proposed a short signature without random oracles. This BB-signature will be used in our construction. We briefly review the BB-signature here.
• Setup: On input the security parameter λ, it generates a pairingê : G × G → G T , where G, G T are cyclic groups of order p. Let g is a generator of G. It randomly picks α ∈ R Z p . The public key is (p, G, G T ,ê, g, g α ) and the secret key is α.
• Sign: On input the message m and the secret key α, the signer computes the signature σ = g 1 α+m .
• Verify: On input the message m, the signature σ and the public key, output accept ifê(g α g m , σ) = e(g, g).
The BB signature is existentially unforgeable under the weak chosen message attack if the SDH assumption holds in G.
SECURITY MODEL
We give our security model and define relevant security notions.
Syntax of linkable threshold ring signature
A linkable threshold ring signature, (LTRS) scheme, is a tuple of five algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify and Link).
• param ← Setup(λ) is a PPT algorithm which, on input a security parameter λ, outputs the set of security parameters param which includes λ. We denote by EID, M and Σ the domains of event-id, messages and signatures, resp.
which, on input a security parameter λ ∈ N, outputs a private/public key pair (sk i , pk i ). We denote by SK and PK the domains of possible secret keys and public keys, resp. When we say that a public key corresponds to a secret key or vice versa, we mean that the secret/public key pair is an output of KeyGen.
• σ ← Sign(e, n, d, Y, X , M ) which, on input event-id e, group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys in PK, a set X of d private keys whose corresponding public keys are all contained in Y, and a message M , produces a signature σ.
• accept/reject ← Verify(e, n, d, Y, M, σ) which, on input event-id e, group size n, threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys in PK, a message-signature pair (M ,σ) returns accept or reject. If accept, the message-signature pair is valid.
which, on input event-id e, group size n 1 , n 2 (assume n 1 ≤ n 2 ), threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n 1 }, two sets Y 1 , Y 2 of n 1 , n 2 public keys respectively, two valid signature and message pairs (M 1 , σ 1 , M 2 , σ 2 ), outputs linked or unlinked.
Remark: According to [18, 31] Correctness. LTRS schemes must satisfy:
• (Verification Correctness.)
Signatures signed according to specification are accepted during verification.
• (Linking Correctness.) If two signatures are signed for the same event according to specification, then they are linked if and only if the two signatures share at least one common signer.
Notions of Security of Linkable Threshold Ring Signature
Security of LTRS schemes has four aspects: unforgeability, anonymity, linkability and non-slanderability. Before giving their definition, we consider the following oracles which together model the ability of the adversaries in breaking the security of the schemes.
• pk i ← J O(⊥). The Joining Oracle, on request, adds a new user to the system. It returns the public key pk ∈ PK of the new user.
• sk i ← CO(pk i ). The Corruption Oracle, on input a public key pk i ∈ PK that is a query output of J O, returns the corresponding secret key sk i ∈ SK.
• σ ← SO(e, n, d, Y, V, M ). The Signing Oracle, on input an event-id e, a group size n, a threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys, a signer subset V of Y with |V| = d, and a message M , returns a valid signature σ .
1. Unforgeability. Unforgeability for LTRS schemes is defined in the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A is given access to oracles J O, CO and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters param. (b) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive strategy. (c) A gives S an event-id e ∈ EID, a group size n ∈ N, a threshold d ∈ {1, . . . , n}, a set Y of n public keys in PK, a message M ∈ M and a signature σ ∈ Σ.
A wins the game if: Anonymity for LTRS schemes is defined in the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A is given access to oracles J O, CO and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters param. (b) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive strategy. Suppose A makes a total number of v queries to CO. The restriction is that:
. . , n}, message M , and a set Y of n public keys all of which are query outputs of J O. S picks randomly a subset V of Y with |V| = d, such that V is not contained in any of the queries to SO and CO. Let X be a set of secret keys with |X | = d and whose corresponding public keys are all contained in
A queries the oracles adaptively. Suppose A makes a total number of v queries to CO. The restriction is that:
If any of the queries to CO(pk) contains a public key pk such that pk ∈ V, or to SO(e, ·, ·, ·, V , ·) such that V ∩ V = Ø, S halts. (e) A outputs an indexπ. Note: We will further show how to enhance the security into Insider Security for Anonymity in Section 5.2. 3. Linkability.
We denote by
Linkability for LTRS schemes is compulsory, that is, it should be infeasible for a set of signers to generate two signatures such that they are determined to be unlinked using LTRS.Link. The following definition/game essentially captures a scenario that an adversary tries to generate two LTRS signatures, say a (d 1 , n 1 )-threshold linkable ring signature and a (d 2 , n 2 )-threshold linkable ring signature, using strictly fewer than d 1 + d 2 user secret keys, so that these two signatures are determined to be unlinked using LTRS.Link. If the LTRS scheme is unforgeable (as defined above), then these signatures can only be generated if at least d 1 and d 2 user secret keys are known, respectively. If less than d 1 +d 2 user secret keys are known, then there must be at least one common signer to both of the signatures. Therefore, this model can effectively capture the definition of individual-linkability given in [26, 21] . Note that it is different from the definition of coalitionlinkability for LTRS schemes.
Linkability for LTRS scheme is defined in the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A is given access to oracles J O, CO and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters param. (b) A may query the oracles according to any adaptive strategy. (c) A gives S an event-id e ∈ EID, group sizes
sets Y 1 and Y 2 of public keys in PK of sizes n 1 and n 2 resp., messages
A wins the game if
such that σ i are not outputs of SO (3) CO has been queried less than 

Adv
Non-Slanderability.
Non-slanderability ensures that no signer can generate a signature which is determined to be linked by LTRS.Link with another signature which is not generated by the signer. In other words, it prevents adversaries from framing honest users.
Non-Slanderability for LTRS schemes is defined in the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A is given access to oracles J O, CO and SO:
(a) S generates and gives A the system parameters param. Except at most d − 1 members of V can be queries to CO, or included in the insider set of any query to SO. In particular, A is allowed to query any public keys which is not in V to CO. (e) A delivers group size n * , threshold d * , a set of n * public keys Y * , a message M * and a signature σ * = σ .
We denote by 
Summarizing we have:
Definition 3.5 (Security of LTRS Schemes). A LTRS scheme is secure if it is unforgeable, linkablyanonymous, linkable and non-slanderable.
OUR PROPOSED THRESHOLD AND
LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE SCHEME Intuition. We modify the Fujisaki traceable ring signature [27] which is inherited from [32, 33, 34] and turn it into Linkable Threshold Ring Signature Scheme. We make use of the following observations:
• We do not need the traceable property of the Fujisaki traceable ring signature. Therefore, we do not need the n linkability tags of the Fujisaki traceable ring signature. We also drop the NIZK and NIWI proofs related to the n linkability tags. We only need one linkability tag for our linkability property. Therefore our signature is much shorter than the Fujisaki traceable ring signature.
• Note that the modification is not trivial! We need to re-design the linking tag in order to make it secure and more efficient. Therefore the approach of our linking tag is totally different from the Fujisaki scheme. Although we take the same assumptions as the Fujisaki scheme, the security proof of our scheme is also different from their scheme.
• Our Link algorithm is more efficient than the Construction. We give our linkable threshold ring signatures as follows:
• Setup: The setup algorithm runs the bilinear group generator (N = pq, G, G T ,ê) ← G(λ). Suppose the group generator G also gives the generators g, h, h ∈ G.
The event ID space is EID , the message space is M and the signature space is Σ. Let (OTGen, OTSign, OTVerify) be a secure one-time signature scheme 4 [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41] . The message space of the OTSign is (
where |pk| is size of a public key, |vk| is the size of a one-time verification key and n is the number of public keys in the ring signature. Let H : EID → Z K be a collision resistant hash function, where K is a security parameter. The public parameters are (N, G, G T ,ê, g, h, h , H).
• KeyGen: For user i, he picks a random
His public key is y i = g xi h di and his secret key is (x i , d i ).
• Sign: On input (e, n, d, Y, X , M ), suppose Y = {pk 1 , . . . , pk n } is the user ring. X is the set of private keys of d participating signers, who cooperate to generate a (d, n) linkable threshold ring signature for the message M with an event-id e. We arrange Y as a ν ×ν matrix, where ν = √ n.
Denote pk (j,k) as the public key at the j-th row and the k-th column.
Each signer i generates (vk i , sk i ) ← OTGen(1 λ ), which is a pair of verification key and signing key for a one-time signature scheme. We assume vk can be represented by an element in Z N . All signers firstly publish their own vk i .
For each signer i with private key (x i , d i ), we denote (j , k ) as the index of pk i in the matrix. He computes the following:
(Note that π 1 is a NIWI proof that σ vk is a BB signature.) (b) Calculate
(Note that π 2 is a NIWI proof that σ T is a BB signature. π 3 is the proof that the signer cannot make another σ T = σ T such that (σ T ) q = (σ T ) q .) (c) Pick some random r l ← Z N and calculate
and π
(Note that C j is a commitment to g while other C l are commitments to 1. The proofs π C l are NIWI proofs that C l are commitments to g or 1.) (d) Pick some random s m ← Z N and calculate
(Note that B m are commitments to the public keys in row j of the matrix. The proofs π B m are NIWI proofs that B m are commitments to the public keys in row j .) (e) Pick some random t m ← Z N and calculate
on the message M with respect to event and Y.
For the d participating signers, they all generate their own linkable ring signature on the same message M and event e. Therefore, the final ring signature includes {vk , σ T, , π LT RS, ,
• Verify: On input (e, n, d, Y, M, σ), first compute τ = H(e) and parse σ = {vk , σ T, , π LT RS, , σ OT, } for 1 ≤ ≤ d. Output accept if all of the following holds
The details of checking each
is as follows:
) and
for all 1 ≤ l ≤ ν and
and verify that
for all 1 ≤ m ≤ ν and
Return accept if all of the above steps verify correctly. Otherwise, output reject.
• Link: On input two signatures σ 1 , σ 2 for two messages M 1 , M 2 and the same event event, suppose σ Remark: The complexity of the Link protocol in Fujisaki ring signature is O(n 2 ). Even if we apply the binary search tree method to their scheme, the complexity is still O(n log n). Theorem 4.4. The threshold linkable ring signature scheme is non-slanderable if the subgroup decision assumption holds in G q , the SDH assumption holds in G p and the one-time signature scheme is unforgeable.
The proofs of the theorems are given in the Appendix.
FURTHER ANALYSIS AND COMPARI-SON
Linkable or Threshold Ring Signatures
Our linkable threshold ring signature is constructed from a linkable ring signature, and uses the linkability tag for threshold signing. Therefore, our proposal can also be used to construct linkable ring signature (with single signer) and threshold ring signature (which is unlinkable).
• To turn our construction into a linkable ring signature, we can simply set d = 1 in our construction.
• To turn our construction into a threshold ring signature which is unlinkable, we can use a nonce to replace the event-id. This nonce can be chosen by an arbitrary signer, and this number should not be re-used. By the linkability property of our construction, we can achieve the threshold property since all signers calculate a linkability tag on the same nonce for each Sign operation. By the non-slander property of our construction, different runs of the Sign protocol give threshold ring signatures which are not linked. It is because the signatures are signed on different nonce (eventid).
Therefore we have threshold and/or linkable ring signature.
Insider Security for Anonymity
For the security model of anonymity for threshold ring signatures (either linkable or not) in the literature, we only consider the anonymity similar to the ring signatures with a single signer. It means that the adversary is given a challenge signature of a ring of n signers, the adversary guesses who is one of the d real signers. It is known as the basic anonymity [42] . If all secret keys of the ring are known to the adversary, it is called the anonymity against full key exposure [42] . Our scheme is proved under this security model. However, anonymity for threshold ring signatures is more complicated than the single signer case. We have to consider if the communication between the d signers is known to the adversary during the generation of the challenge signature. We also have to consider the case that the adversary can participate in the generation of the challenge signature, by acting as some of the d signers. To the best of the author's knowledge, no threshold ring signatures in the literature considered this insider attack from the adversary. Their security model implies a secure channel between the signers and all signers are honest during the generation of threshold ring signatures [43] . However, it may not be true in the real world. Therefore, we propose a new security model for anonymity against full key exposure and insider attack. The security game is modified as follows.
Linkable-Anonymity. Anonymity for LTRS schemes is defined in the following game between the Simulator S and the Adversary A in which A is given access to oracles J O, CO and SO:
1. S generates and gives A the system parameters param. 2. A may query the oracles according to any adaptive strategy. Suppose A makes a total number of v queries to CO. The restriction is that: v < n − d. Eventually, the challenge signature σ is outputted to A. 4. A queries the oracles adaptively. Suppose A makes a total number of v queries to CO. The restriction is that:
If any of the queries to CO(pk) contains a public key pk such that pk ∈ V, or to SO(e, ·, ·, ·, V , ·) such that V ∩ V = Ø, S halts. 5. A outputs an indexπ. The proof of this theorem is very similar to the proof of theorem 4.2. For the challenge signature, we can see that all communications between signers are the NIWI proofs. Therefore, the adversary cannot use it to break the anonymity of the scheme.
We denote by
Adv Anon A (λ) = Pr[π ∈ V] − d − d n − (v + v ) .
Insider Security of Other Threshold Ring
Signatures. For most threshold ring signature schemes, there exists a party who is responsible to generate the "partial" signatures (part of the final signatures) for the non-participating members in the ring. These "partial" signatures are generated from the public key / identities of those non-participating members. And these "partial" signatures are indistinguishable from the partial signatures generated from the real signers (which require the secret key of those signers). Examples can be found in [11, 21, 44, 45, 26, 43] . Therefore, this party knows who are the real signers. Previous security model does not capture the attack that the adversary is acting as this party.
Comparison
Linkable Threshold Ring Signatures. Tsang et al. [21] proposed the first linkable threshold ring signature scheme based on the strong RSA problem and the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem. Tsang et al. [26] proposed another linkable threshold ring signature scheme which has similar complexity and is secure under the same assumptions. These two schemes are secure in the random oracle model (ROM) only.
Our proposal is secure in the standard model under the SDH assumption, the subgroup decision assumption, the DDHI assumption and the security of the one-time signature (OTS) scheme. Our proposal is more efficient than the previous schemes if d < √ n. It is possible in the real world applications, when the signers are concern about their anonymity. For example, a 10-out-of-1000 threshold ring signature appears to be "more anonymous" to a 10-out-of-100 threshold ring signature. The size of the ring n is much larger the number of the actual signers d, then our proposal is more efficient.
Moreover, the size of all linkability tags is O(d) in our scheme, while it is O(n) in other schemes. Therefore, the running time of the Link protocol is smaller in our scheme. Since we propose an optimization of the Link protocol, the running time is further reduced to O(d log d). We summerize the comparison in Table 1 .
Threshold Ring Signatures. Bresson et al. [11] proposed the threshold ring signature scheme based on the RSA problem. However, this scheme is not efficient. Liu et al. [45] proposed a threshold ring signature using Shamir secret sharing. The security of the scheme is based on the discrete logarithm (DL) and the RSAcollision problem. Tsang et al. [26] proposed the first identity-based threshold ring signature, whose security is based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem. Tsang et al. also pointed out a flaw in the security proof of the identity-based threshold ring signature by Han et al. [46] . Tsang et al. [26] proposed a threshold ring signature, whose security is based on the strong RSA problem and DDH problem.
Melchor et al. [47] and Dallot and Vergnaud [48] proposed threshold ring signatures based on coding theory. The security of the scheme of Melchor et al. [47] is based on the Minimum Distance problem, while the security of the scheme of Dallot and Vergnaud [48] is based on the Goppa Parameterized Bounded Decoding (GPBD) problem and Goppa Code Distinguisher (GD).
Cayrel et al. [49] proposed a lattice-based threshold ring signatures. The security is based on the Short Integer Solution problem.
Yuen et al. [43] proposed the first threshold ring signatures in the standard model. The security is based on the CDH problem. We summerize the comparison in Table 2 .
Linkable Ring Signatures. Liu et al. [16] proposed the first linkable ring signature scheme based on the DL problem and the DDH problem.
Tsang and Wei [18] proposed a linkable ring signature, whose security is based on the link decisional RSA (LD-RSA) problem and the DDH. Liu and Wong [19] proposed a linkable ring signature, whose security is based on the DL problem and the DDH. Au et al. [23] improved the scheme [21] by showing the new scheme is secure in a stronger security model, under the LD-RSA assumption, the DDH assumption and the strong RSA assumption.
Zheng et al. [25] proposed a linkable ring signatures from linear feedback shift register. Its security is based on the state-based DL (S-DL) assumption and the statebased decisional product Diffie-Hellman (S-DPDH) assumption. Recently, Fujisaki [27] proposed the first linkable ring signature scheme without random oracles which relies on various assumptions. We summerize the comparison in Table 3 .
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented the first linkable threshold ring signature (LTRS) without random oracles. When compared to previous LTRS schemes (which are only secure in the random oracle model), we also enjoy significant efficiency improvement. Our scheme can be regarded as a "regular" threshold ring signature scheme (i.e., without linkability). The signature size of our scheme is shorter than all previous threshold ring 
When we come across the computation of sign and verify, we use E to represent an exponentiation, M to represent a multi-bases exponentiation which is equal to the cost of approximate 1.3 exponentation, P to represent a pairing, OTS to represent a one-time signature signing and OTV to represent a one-time signature verification. Table 1 , when we come across the computation of sign and verify, we use E to represent an exponentiation, M to represent a multi-bases exponentiation and P to represent a pairing. In addition, we use C to represent a symmetric cipher operation. b The scheme in [47] is based on coding theory. The signing and verification processes require 140m 2 n matrix operations as described in their paper. The size of the matrix is m × (m − k) where m, k are some security parameters. c The scheme in [49] is also based on coding theory. The authors stated that if n = 100, the required number of runs of matrix operation is about 111 for signing and verification for an acceptable security level. Table 1 , when we come across the computation of sign and verify, we use E to represent an exponentiation, M to represent a multi-bases exponentiation and P to represent a pairing. b The scheme in [25] relies on Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) and the computations are sequence operations. signature schemes if d < √ n. Furthermore, if we set the threshold value to be 1, our scheme is a (1-out-of-n) linkable ring signature scheme. The linking complexity of our scheme is much faster than the Fujisaki scheme, which is the only linkable ring signature scheme secure in the standard model.
We also enhanced the security model of threshold ring signature scheme, by allowing the adversary to be any insider interacting with other participating signers. We claim that this security model should be more practical in the real life. APPENDIX A. ON THE "ATTACK" OF LINKABLE RING SIGNA-TURE BY WANG AND ZHAO [45] In [28] , the authors claimed all existing linkable ring signature schemes suffer from linkability attack. Specifically, it is claimed that a malicious signer can generate two ring signatures that are not linked together. This break the requirement of linkability. It is also claimed that a malicious signer can generate a signature that is linked to another signature generated by an honest signer. This break the requirement of nonslanderability. A careful look into the paper reveals that the attacks are carried out in a different model which, we think is just too strong and unreasonable.
Using the terminology of the paper, the malicious signer is in fact holding two secret keys, x π and x s , of the members in the ring. In the attack against linkability, the malicious signer first obtains a signature σ which originates from singer whose secret key is x s . Next, the malicious signer uses a seperate secret key x π to generate another signature σ 1 . The authors go on to claim that this malicious signer has successfully broken the linkability property since σ and σ 1 does not linked together. This claim is unreasonable since someone holding two secret keys should be allowed to generate two ring signatures that are not linked together.
The so-called attack against non-slanderability works in a similar fashion. In the attack, the malicious signer obtains a signature σ from the signing oracle where the secret key of its signer is x s . Strangely, it is assumed that, in this attack, the value of x s is known to this malicious signer. This attacker simply generates another signature σ using the knowledge of Proof. Let G 0 be the original unforgeability game. Let G 1 be the same as G 0 , except that h is selected from the sub-group G q instead of G. If the subgroup decision assumption holds, the adversary A cannot distinguish G 0 and G 1 . Now we simulate G 1 as follows.
Setup.
The simulator S runs the bilinear group generator (N = pq, G, G T ,ê) ← G(1 λ ). Suppose D is the challenger of the BB signature in G p and S tries to forge a BB signature.
Firstly, S runs (vk i , sk i ) ← OTGen(λ) for 1 ≤ i ≤ q s . According to the weak unforgeability model of the BB signature, S gives {1, . . . , K}, {vk 1 , . . . , vk qs } as the "message" of the BB signature. D gives the public parameter g p and the public key g α p of the BB signature to S. D also gives the BB signatures for all these messages to S.
1/q . S picks a random β ∈ Z N and h ∈ G q using p. S sets h = g β . Finally, S randomly chooses a collision resistant hash function H : EID → Z K . Then S gives the public parameters (N, G, G T ,ê, g, h, h , H) to the adversary A.
Assume that A makes q j query to J O. S picks τ * as the challenge signer. For i = 1, . . . , q j , S picks random x i , d i ∈ Z N and sets:
S stores the set of public keys {pk i } n i=1 . Oracle Simulation. S simulates the oracles as follows:
• J O: on the i-th query, S returns pk i .
• CO(pk i ): If i = τ * , S declares failure and exits. Otherwise, S returns (
, and a set of d signers V, S calculates all {vk , σ T, , π LT RS, , π OT, } according to the Sign algorithm, for all pk ∈ V and = τ * . If pk τ * ∈ V, S calculates τ = H(e) ∈ {1, . . . , K}. S retrieves the BB signatures σ vki and σ T for messages vk i and τ , respectively. S uses σ vki and d τ * to compute:
S uses σ T and d τ * to compute:
Finally, S calculates the rest of the signature according to the Sign algorithm, using the one-time signing key sk i .
to the q-th power, we can see that either C l or C l g −1 has order p. Since ) for all 1 ≤ m ≤ ν, we can raise it to the q-th power. We havê e(g, pk j * ,m )
, we can raise it to the q-th power. We
) · e(h, π 1 ) to the q-th power. We havê
If L is not a previous signing oracle output, then S returns L q as the forgery to the BB signature in G p for the "message" vk.
Otherwise (L is the same as the previous signing oracle output), check if the corresponding σ OT, is the same as the previous signing oracle output. If they are not the same, it implies that σ OT, is a forgery of the one-time signature for the verification key vk . If they are the same, observe that σ OT, is a one-time signature on all verification keys {vk 1 , . . . , vk d }. Since the signature outputted by A cannot be the same as the previous signing oracle output, then A must forge a the one-time signature for some verification key vk i , where i = 1, . . . , d.
If such pk j * ,k * = pk τ * for all π LT RS, , then S aborts.
Analysis. The probability of not asking pk τ in the corruption oracle is 1− qc qj . The probability of pk τ * ∈ Y * and pk j * ,k * = pk τ * for some π LT RS, in the output phase is d * n * . Note that the BB signature is weakly unforgeable if the SDH assumption holds. Therefore S solves the q s + K-SDH problem, the subgroup decision problem or forges a one-time signature with probability d where
S is asked to determine whether Aτ = g 1 x+τ or not. S randomly picks β, γ ∈ Z N and sets
Finally, S randomly chooses a collision resistant hash function H : EID × {0, 1} * → Z K . Then S gives the public parameters (N, G, G T ,ê, g, h, h , H) to the adversary A.
Assume that A makes q j = K query to J O. S picks τ * as the challenge signer. For i = 1, . . . , q j , S picks random x i , d i ,x ∈ Z N and sets:
S stores the set of public keys
. In the later part, we will implicitly set pk i = g x h di , where x is unknown from the problem instance. It implies that d i = (x − x)/β, which is not known as well. We will simulate the NIWI proofs without using x and d i .
Oracle Simulation. S simulates the oracles as follows:
• CO(pk i ): If i = τ * , S declares failure and exits. Otherwise, S returns (x i , d i ).
• SO(e, n, d, Y, V, M ): On input a message M , a set of n public keys
, and a set of d signers V, S calculates all {vk , σ T, , π LT RS, , π OT, } according to the Sign algorithm, for all pk ∈ V and = τ * . If pk τ * ∈ V, S runs (vk, sk) ← OTGen(λ) and τ = H(e). If τ =τ , then S declares failure and exits. Otherwise, S uses A τ from the problem instance and the trapdoor β to complete the NIZK proof. S picks r,L ∈ Z N and computes:
It is easy to check that π 1 , π 2 , π 3 can pass the verification. Finally, S calculates the rest of the signature according to the Sign algorithm.
Challenge. At some point, A outputs a message M * , an event-id e * , a set of n * public keys Y * and a threshold d * . S picks a random subset V * of Y * with |V * | = d * , such that
• pk τ * ∈ V * ; • any public key in V * is not contained in any query to CO;
• there was no query to SO with input (e * , ·, ·, ·, V, ·), where V ∩ V * = Ø.
S calculates all {vk * , σ * T, , π * LT RS, , π * OT, } according to the Sign algorithm, for all pk ∈ V * and = τ * . S runs (vk, sk) ← OTGen(λ) and τ = H(e * ). If τ =τ , then S declares failure and exits. Otherwise, S uses Aτ from the problem instance and the trapdoor β to complete the Sign algorithm similar to the simulation of the signing oracle. Finally, S returns the whole challenge signature to A.
Output. If A can correct guess the indexπ = τ * , then S outputs Aτ = g 1 x+τ . Otherwise, S outputs Aτ ∈ G.
Analysis.
In the challenge signature {vk * , σ * T, , π * LT RS, , π * OT, }, vk * and π * OT,
are from the one-time signature and hence do not contain any information about the signer's secret key. π * LT RS, is a NIWI proof such that the commitments are perfectly binding and the proofs are witness indistinguishable. The remaining part of the signature is σ * T, . Note that pk τ * is a random element in the set V * . If A correctly guesses pk τ * ∈ V * with probability greater than d * n * −(qc+qs) , then S can solve the K-DDHI problem.
Note that the probability of not to abort during the simulation is
where q s is the number of signing oracle query. The value K should be chosen in a way that K is large enough that H : EID → Z K is a collision resistant hash function, and K is small enough that the abort probability of S is small. In addition, if K is smaller, the K-DDHI assumption is weaker. For example, we can set K = 2q s . The probability of not to abort is Proof. This theorem can be proven by a sequence of games.
• Let G 0 be the original individual-linkability game.
• Let G 1 be the same as G 0 , except that h is selected from the sub-group G q instead of G.
• Let G 2 be the same as G 1 , except that A wins if A wins in G 1 and A can output a pair (σ T , σ T ) such that σ T = σ T and (σ T ) q = (σ T ) q , where (σ T , σ T ) are from the signatures σ 1 , σ 2 returned by A respectively.
• Let G 3 be the same as G 2 , except that h is selected from G instead of the sub-group G q . • Let G 4 be the same as G 3 , except that h is selected from the sub-group G p instead of G.
If the subgroup decision assumption holds in G q , the adversary A cannot distinguish between G 0 and G 1 , between G 2 and G 3 , and between G 3 and G 4 . Proof. Setup. We first simulate G 1 as follows. The simulator S runs the bilinear group generator (N = pq, G, G T ,ê) ← G(1 λ ). S picks a random β ∈ Z N and h ∈ G q using p. S sets h = g β . Finally, S randomly chooses a collision resistant hash function H : EID → Z K . Then S gives the public parameters (N, G, G T ,ê, g, h, h , H) to the adversary A.
Oracle Simulation. S honestly simulates the oracles using the user secret keys. Similar to the proof of unforgeability, we can show that C b, is a commitment to some public key g xi h di ∈ Y b . S raisesê(g τ C b, , σ T,b, ) =ê(g, g) ·ê(h, π 2,b, ) to the q-th power. We havê e(g τ g xi , σ T,b, ) q =ê(g, g) q .
Therefore (σ T,b, ) q = (g 1 τ +x i ) q . Note that A is only given q c < d 1 + d 2 secret keys, and σ T,b, cannot be the output of SO using the same event e. If A wins the game, it means that all tags σ T,b, are distinct. By the unforgeability property, there exists at least a pair (σ T , σ T ) such that σ T = σ T and (σ T ) q = (σ T ) q . (For example, if σ T = g 1 τ +x i , where σ T is not the output from SO and x i is not the output from CO, it means that σ T is a forgery.) Therefore, we can see that if the threshold linkable ring signature scheme is unforgeable, then A can win in both game G 1 and G 2 . Therefore the extra winning condition in G 2 does not affect A's probability of winning.
Lemma B.2. There is no adversary who can win G 4 with non-negligible probability if the subgroup decision assumption holds in G p .
Proof. Setup. We simulate G 4 as follows. The simulator S is given the subgroup decision problem instance (N, G, G T ,ê, g, h ). S picks a random β ∈ Z N . S sets h = g β . Finally, S randomly chooses a collision resistant hash function H : EID → Z K . Then S gives the public parameters (N, G, G T ,ê, g, h, h , H) to the adversary A.
